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NOTES
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF
1976: DIRECT EFFECTS AND MINIMUM
CONTACTS
The "direct effects" test of the commercial activities exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)' provides for
jurisdiction over any foreign sovereign whose act or omission outside
the United States causes a direct effect within the United States, if
that act or omission is connected with a commercial activity.2 Con-
gress left the development of a workable direct-effects test, however,
to the judiciary.3 In developing such a test, courts have had difficulty
balancing the need for redressing the injuries of their own residents
against the impropriety of unilaterally setting the terms by which
foreign sovereigns may conduct business in their own countries.4
This Note explores the development of a direct-effects test from
two perspectives. First, it examines the legislative history to deter-
mine the most plausible statutory interpretation.5 Second, it exam-
ines that interpretation in light of the constitutional requirements of
due process enunciated most recently by the Supreme Court in
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.6 There, the Court
refined the "minimum contacts" requirement in the context of a state
long-arm statute with a jurisdictional reach similar to that of the
direct-effects test.7 This Note concludes that the most plausible stat-
utory interpretation of the direct-effects test is inconsistent with the
due process requirements set forth in World- Wide Volkswagen. 8
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codi-
fied iii scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). See text accompanying notes 22-23 infra.
3. See notes 25-26 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Harris v. VAO Intourist, Mos-
cow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), where the court correctly noted that "[t]he
sensitive and difficult problems presented by possible conflicts between private rights and
international comity are, under our Constitution, peculiarly fitted for executive and legis-
lative resolution."
4. See notes 71-78 infra and accompanying text. See also Note, Sovereign Immu-
nit , 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 439 n.48 (1977).
5. See generally notes 9-64 infra and accompanying text.
6. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
7. See notes 83-91 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 92-99 infra and accompanying text.
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I
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The FSIA clarifies the occasions and procedures by which
plaintiffs may sue foreign states, their agents or instrumentalities 9 in
U.S. courts. The Act codifies the "restrictive" theory of the interna-
tional law principle of sovereign immunity. It therefore limits
immunity to suits involving a foreign state's public acts; immunity
does not extend to suits based on the sovereign's private or commer-
cial acts. 10 Unlike the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, how-
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976) provides:
(a) A "foreign state". . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ...nor created
under the laws of any third country.
See, e.g., Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (corporation
created and wholly owned by the Libyan government was a "foreign state"); Yessenin-
Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, Tass, 443 F. Supp. 849, 852-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (press
agency 63% owned by Soviet state held to be a "foreign state," partly on the basis of the
"essentially public nature" of such organizations in the U.S.S.R.); Edlow Int'l Co. v.
Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831-32 (D.D.C. 1977) (Yugoslavian
nuclear power plant operated by workers' organization held not an "agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state").
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6605. The
House and Senate Judiciary Committees adopted identical reports, with different pagina-
tions. See S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). All future references will be to
the House Report.
Prior to 1952, the State Department adhered to the "absolute" theory of sovereign
immunity. Under this theory, a foreign state or its instrumentality was immune from suit
in the United States, whether or not the lawsuit involved the public or private acts of the
state. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (testimony of Michael Marks
Cohen) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
The State Department shifted its position in 1952 when it officially adopted the
"restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity. See Letter from Acting Legal Advisor to the
State Department Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19,
1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter].
This policy recognizes the absolute immunity of a foreign nation or its instrumentality
with respect to its "public" or "governmental" acts. Immunity is denied, however, in
suits involving the state's "private" or "commercial" acts. Thus, a foreign nation would
not usually be sheltered from litigation over ordinary business transactions in the forum
state.
The realization that a substantial majority of nations of the world adopted the restric-
tive approach spurred this change in policy. The United States did not receive a quid pro
quo when it was sued in most foreign countries. "It is thus evident that with the possible
exception of the United Kingdom little support has been found except on the part of the
Soviet Union and its satellites for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of
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ever, the FSIA does not require the court to determine thepurpose of
the foreign state's activity, but rather the nature of that activity."
The FSIA transfers sovereign immunity determinations from
the executive branch to the judiciary, thereby eliminating the State
Department's political discretion in settling immunity pleas,' 2 and
sovereign immunity." Tate Letter, supra, at 985. See also J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 21 (1963). Not only did this shift bring U.S.
policy into line with the rest of the world, but because of the expansion of international
trade, it provided a greater degree of protection and security for significantly greater
numbers of American citizens requiring adjudication of claims arising out of their con-
tacts with foreign states. Tate Lettter, supra, at 985.
The Supreme Court upheld the restrictive theory ("act of state" doctrine) in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The Court held that
the defendant failed to establish an act of state because it did not show that Cuba's
repudiation of a debt was "invested with sovereign authority," rather than merely "aris-
ing from the operation of [a] commercial enterprise." Id. at 692-95. See also Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977) (Libya's
seizure of property owned by independent oil producer held to be "non-commercial sov-
ereign activity.").
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976) provides:
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activ-
ity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct orpartic-
ular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
(emphasis added). See National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp.
622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), arfdon other grounds, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). In that case, a
foreign sovereign sought immunity on grounds that cement it ordered under a disputed
contract was intended for military purposes. The court held that since the purpose for
which a foreign government purchases goods is irrelevant under the FSIA, the defend-
ant's sovereign immunity defense must fail. Id. at 641-42. See also Yessenin-Volpin v.
Novosti Press Agency, Tass, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court noted
that a given entity may at times engage in commercial activity, which is not immune,
while at other times perform essentially governmental actions and thus be protected by
sovereign immunity. The court held that certain allegedly libelous articles were the
result of the TASS agency's essentially governmental activity, since the articles were
jointly written by TASS and certain other agencies of the Russian government, and since
the articles were commentaries on the Soviet government. Id. at 855-57.
12. Although the State Department adopted the restrictive theory as a matter of pol-
icy, it retained great discretion. If the executive branch felt that a particular grant of
sovereign immunity would be advantageous for foreign policy or general diplomatic
relations, the State Department remained free to file a "suggestion of immunity" with the
court, whether or not the action related to the defendant's public or private acts. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7, 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 6606, 6607. See also House Hearings, supra note 10, at 63-64. The Department
infrequently exercised such discretion, yet situations arose where this flexibility proved
particulary useful. Michael H. Cardozo related one such instance in his testimony before
the House Subcommittee:
MR. KINDNESS. But your point is that the enactment of this bill into law would
remove the flexibility so that an exception could no longer be made to a general
policy?.
MR. CARDozo. That's what worries me. I think that flexibility may be impor-
tant in particular cases. The most interesting one in recent times, of course, was
the case of the Eastern Airlines plane that was hijacked to Cuba just at the time
that a Cuban vessel was being attached in this country.
And when we approached the Cubans and said, "Surely, you're going to
release that plane and its passengers immediately," they said, "Oh, of course, we
1981]
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assuring that such determinations are made according to consistently
applied legal principles.' 3 The Act also provides a procedure for
serving process on foreign states, eliminating the need to attach
property to obtain jurisdiction.14
The FSIA creates a federal long-arm statute providing for both
in personam and subject matter jurisdiction under certain specified
circumstances.' 5 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) provides for personal jurisdic-
tion "as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
[subject matter] jurisdiction under subsection (a)."' 6 Subsection
1330(a) grants subject matter jurisdiction over "any nonjury civil
action against a foreign state. . . with respect to which the foreign
state is not entitled to immunity . . . under sections 1605-1607."'17
Read together, subsections (a) and (b) indicate that a court has both
subject matter and in personam jurisdiction in every case in which a
foreign state is not entitled to immunity under sections 1605-1607.18
In other words, a district court has personal jurisdiction under
section 1330(b) if it has subject matter jurisdiction under section
1330(a), which in turn requires the "minimum contacts" specified by
the immunity provisions of sections 1605-1607.' 9
will, just as soon as you release our ship." And the State Department very quick-
ly sent a telegram to the judge in that case and said, "We suggest the immunity,"
although it was a commercial transaction. The ship was quickly released and the
plane was released. That could be quite important.
House Hearings, supra note 10, at 65-66.
On the other hand, the executive branch often found itself in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of "playing favorites" among foreign governments. This inconsistency and resulting
diplomatic friction, as well as the administrative burden of making individual immunity
determinations, led the State Department to support the bill that ultimately removed this
discretion. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 28-29 (testimony of Monroe Leigh,
Legal Adviser, Dep't of State).
13. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 6605-06.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6606. The Act limits the absolute immunity of
foreign states to attachment of property to execute a judgment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611
(1976).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
16. Id. § 1330(b).
17. Id. § 1330(a). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (1976) confer blanket immunity upon for-
eign sovereigns, subject to certain exceptions relating to the commercial or private activi-
ties of the defendant. These exceptions coincide with the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, discussed at note 10 supra.
18. The legislative history supports this interpretation of the relationship between
section 1330 and sections 1605-1607. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6612:
Section 1330(b) provides, in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over foreign
states. . . .For personal jurisdiction to exist under section 1330(b), the claim
must first of all be one over which the district courts have original jurisdiction
under section 1330(a), meaning a claim for which the foreign state is not entitled
to immunity.
19. The House Report states:
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II
FSIA IMMUNITY PROVISIONS: MINIMUM
CONTACTS
Section 1604 provides that "a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." 20
The exceptions to this grant of immunity in section 1605 are condi-
tioned upon the defendant's commercial activity in or affecting the
United States. Section 1605 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state;2 1 or upon an act performed in the
The requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice are
embodied in the provision. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957). . . . Significantly, each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections
1605-1607, requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United States,
or an express or implied waiver by the foreign state of its immunity from juris-
diction. [See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976)] These immunity provisions, there-
fore, prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before our courts can
exercise personal jurisdiction.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
at 6612 (footnote added).
In Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the
court stated:
[T]he Immunities Act incorporates in the same provisions answers to three
issues: (1) when to grant immunity, i.e., making the distinction between com-
mercial and governmental activity; (2) what is the basis for long-arm in per-
sonam jurisdiction (a question handled with great sophistication and specificity
in the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, various state statutes
and in the District of Columbia statute); and (3) how great is the scope of subject
matter jurisdiction. The effect of this construction is to conceal distinctions that
need to be drawn in careful analysis.
The FSIA's application of the same criteria to determine both in personam and subject
matter jurisdiction is unusual. A federal court typically obtains subject matter jurisdic-
tion in two ways. Federal question jurisdiction exists if the cause of action arises under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp.
1981). A federal court has diversity jurisdiction if the cause of action is between "(1)
citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
[or] (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties," and if the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1976). Personal jurisdiction, however, usually depends on distinct criteria and policies.
See notes 71-75 infra and accompanying text. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1063, at 202-05 (1969). The FSIA collapses the
distinction between subject matter and in personam jurisdiction in actions involving for-
eign sovereigns.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
21. "A commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state means
commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1976) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to be
subject to jurisdiction under the first clause of § 1605(a)(2), the statute itself suggests that
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United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 22
The direct-effects exception has caused problems of interpreta-
tion; courts have had difficulty assessing the degree of "contacts"
between the defendant and the forum necessary to confer jurisdic-
tion over him. 23 The House Report indicates that courts should
apply the direct-effects test in light of both the District of Columbia
long-arm statute24 and section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States.25 The remainder of this sec-
the foreign sovereign must meet the due process requirements of minimum contacts. See
East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'dmem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979).
The first clause of § 1605(a)(2) closely resembles the "transaction of business" provi-
sions of many state long-arm statutes. See notes 42-48 infra and accompanying text. It is
not equivalent, however, to the less restrictive "doing business" provisions of some state
long-arm statutes. See note 28 infra.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) (emphasis and footnote added).
23. See, e.g., Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C.
1978), aff'dmenz, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
The legislative history suggests that the third clause of § 1605(a)(2) should be read
restrictively. In hearings held before the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Chief of
the Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, of the Department of Justice "stressed that
the long-arm feature of the bill will insure that only those disputes which have a relation
to the United States are litigated in the courts of the United States, and that our courts
are not turned into small 'international courts of claims."' He maintained that Congress
did not intend the FSIA to "open up our courts to all comers to litigate any dispute which
any private party may have with a foreign state anywhere in the world." House Hear-
ings, supra note 10, at 31 (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau). See also Note, Sovereign
Immunity, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 437-40 (1977) (arguing that the "effect" required by
§ 1605(a)(2) should be more significant than that required by the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution).
24. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, at 6612 ("Section 1330(b) . . . is patterned after the long-arm statute Con-
gress enacted for the District of Columbia."). As explained above, § 1330 relies directly
on the immunity provisions of §§ 1605-1607 in order to determine jurisdiction. See notes
17-18 supra and accompanying text. The House Report states that section 1330 and sec-
tion 1605 are "carefully interconnected." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 14, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 6612. In Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow,
481 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the court commented that "[i]n interpreting
section 1605. . . courts properly look to the interpretations given the District of Colum-
bia long-arm provisions." See also Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266
(D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In spite of such arguments,
this Note maintains that Congress did not intend to incorporate the specftc provisions of
the District of Columbia long-arm statute into the FSIA. Rather, Congress only meant
that in personam jurisdiction of district courts over foreign sovereigns requires that the
sovereign have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum, a requirement common to
the District of Columbia long-arm statute, the FSIA, and the due process clause of the
U.S. Constitution. See notes 50-54 infra and accompanying text.
25. The House Report states that the direct-effects clause of § 1605(a)(2) is to be
interpreted "consistent with principles set forth in section 18" of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965). HOUSE REPORT,
[Vol. 14:97
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tion examines both of these interpretations of the direct-effects
clause. As will be shown, the specific provisions of the District of
Columbia long-arm statute are inapplicable to the direct-effects
test.26 The Restatement approach, on the other hand, provides a
workable statutory construction consistent with the legislative his-
tory and the language of the statute.27
A. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LONG-ARM STATUTE
The District of Columbia long-arm statute confers in personam
jurisdiction over a defendant based upon his "enduring relationship"
with the forum or upon his conduct in relation to the forum. 28 Sec-
tion 13-422 of the D.C. Code provides: "A District of Columbia
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in,
organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place
of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for relief. 29
This section is inapplicable to the FSIA.30 The FSIA does not
provide that a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign merely because it has an "enduring relationship" with the
forum state. The FSIA imposes at least two further requirements.
supra note 10, at 19, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6618. See
notes 55-64 infra and accompanying text. The fact that Congress explicitly stated that
courts should interpret the direct-effects clause in light of the Restatement-as compared
with Congress's reference to the D.C. Code in the context of the broad jurisdictional
provision of § 1330(b)-makes it hard to understand why courts nevertheless rely on the
much more tenuous reference to the District of Columbia long-arm statute, especially
given the many difficulties involved in trying to use the specific provisions of that statute
as a direct-effects test. See, e.g., Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056,
1061-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
26. See notes 29-54 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 55-64 infra and accompanying text.
28. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-422 (1973) ("Personal jurisdiction based upon endur-
ing relationship"); id. § 13-423 ("Personal jurisdiction based upon conduct"). These two
sections are also codified in the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCE-
DURE ACT, §§ 1.02-1.03, 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 307, 308-10 (1966).
Significantly, § 13-422 is more restrictive than the more liberal "doing business" long-
arm provisions of many state statutes. Section 13-422 does not confer jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant simply because he is "doing business" in the forum. The defend-
ant must also be domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintain his principal
place of business in the forum. Compare the rule in New York, where courts generally
approve pbrsonal jurisdiction if the out-of-state defendant has "engaged in such a contin-
uous and systematic course of 'doing business' [in New York] as to warrant a finding of
its 'presence' in this jurisdiction." Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 285,
200 N.E.2d 427, 429, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (1964). See also Gelfand v. Tanner Motor
Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964), on remand, 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967); Frum-
mer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d
439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1972).
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-422 (1973) (emphasis added).
30. Cf. Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
("[E]ven if the legislative history of the [FSIA] and its language were stretched to encom-
pass" § 13-422, the defendants did not have such an "enduring relationship.").
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First, the foreign sovereign must be involved in a "commercial activ-
ity."' Second, and more importantly, the specific activity that gives
rise to the lawsuit must arise from the contacts specified in sections
1605-1607.32 Since section 13-422 does not require a connection
between the lawsuit and the "enduring relationship," Congress
clearly did not intend this particular provision of the D.C. Code to
apply to jurisdictional determinations under the FSIA.
The next section of the District of Columbia statute, section 13-
423, provides for personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the
defendant has certain specified contacts with the forum.33 Unlike
section 13-422, section 13-423 requires a connection between the spe-
cific activity, or "contacts" described in clauses (1) to (6), and the
"claim for relief."34 Two clauses are superficially applicable to the
direct-effects test: section 13-423(a)(4) ("tortious injury") and sec-
tion 13-423(a)(1) ("transaction of business").35
Section 13-423(a)(4) provides for jurisdiction over a person who
has caused tortious injury in the forum by an act or omission outside
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976), quoted at text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (b) (1976). See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423 (1973) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a per-
son, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claimfor relief arising from the
person's-
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia fhe regularly does or solicits business, engages
in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia,
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of
Columbia; or
(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or
risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed
within the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties
otherwise provide in writing.
(emphasis added).
34. Id § 13-423(a).
35. The other clauses of § 13-423(a) involve contacts predicated upon a defendant's
conduct in theforura Thus, contracting to supply services in the forum (§ 13-423(a)(2)),
committing a tortious act in the forum (§ 13-423(a)(3)), having an interest in, using, or
possessing real property in the District of Columbia (§ 13-423(a)(5)) and contracting to
insure any person, property, risk contract, obligation or agreement (§ 13-423(a)(6)) all
involve an act or acts of the defendant that take place in the District of Columbia. These
provisions are analogous to the first two clauses of § 1605(a)(2). See text accompanying
notes 21-22 supra. Although the first clause of § 13-423(a) ("transaction of business")
seemingly requires that the defendant's act take place in the forum state, courts have
interpreted similar provisions in other states to include out-of-state acts that cause tor-
tious injury in the state in cases where the defendant introduced a defective product into
a chain of distribution if he could forsee its use in the forum. See notes 43-44 infra and
accompanying text.
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the forum and who has certain specified contacts with the forum in
addition to the injury.36 Of the six clauses of section 13-423, only the
"tortious injury" clause specifically refers to acts or omissions
outside the forum causing effects inside the forum. Therefore, this
clause applies most directly to the direct-effects test of the FSIA.
There are two reasons, however, why the tortious injury provi-
sion is inapplicable to the direct-effects test. First, section 13-
423(a)(4) is limited to torts, 37 whereas the direct-effects test applies to
any commercial activity carried on by a foreign sovereign. 38 Second,
although section 13-423(a)(4), like the direct-effects test, requires a
connection between the claim for relief and the tortious injury, it
also requires that the defendant have other contacts with the forum
unrelated to the tortious act.39 Indeed, a defendant who satisfies
those requirements can be subjected to in personam jurisdiction for
any tortious injury he causes in the forum, regardless of whether that
injury arises out of those particular "contacts." Nevertheless, the
tort giving rise to the claim, without more, could never satisfy the
test of section 13-423(a)(4), because the District of Columbia provi-
sion specifically requires that the defendant have some continuing
contact with the forum, other than causing the injury there.40 The
direct-effects test of the FSIA, on the other hand, only requires that
the act itself have a direct effect within the forum state. This test,
unlike section 13-423(a)(4) of the D.C. Code, does not require the
court to analyze the defendant's other contacts with the forum in
order to determine whether the tortious act has a direct effect on the
36. The statute requires, in addition to the tortious injury, that the person "regularly
does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of
Columbia." D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(4) (1973). Thus, the statute is more restrictive
than the Illinois tortious injury provision, as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). The Illinois statute was the progenitor of this type of long-arm provision. See
generally Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 532, 563-67 (1969); 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 310, 312
(1966); Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1213, 1216 (D.D.C. 1973).
37. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(4) (1973). See note 33 supra.
38. See Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The
court noted that whereas the District of Columbia long-arm statute "make[s] distinctions
based on traditional classifications of causes of action such as 'commercial'--e.g., con-
tract-and 'tort'-e.g., negligence, products liability and libel," the FSIA distinguishes
between "'governmental' and 'commercial' activity." Id at 1063.
39. See note 36 supra.
40. In Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
among others, for the death of an American tourist in a Moscow hotel fire. The court
held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The court based its deci-
sion, in part, upon the tortious injury provision of the District of Columbia long-arm
statute. "[Courts in. . . the District of Columbia have rejected jurisdiction when the
only contact in the forum is an injurious consequence of an out-of-state act or omission."
Id at 1064.
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forum state. This fundamentally different focus strongly suggests
that the tortious injury provision of the District of Columbia long-
arm statute is unsuited as a direct-effects test within the meaning of
section 1605(a)(2). 41
The "transaction of business" provision of section 13-423 is the
other clause at least superficially applicable to the direct-effects
test.42 Section 13-423(a)(1) confers in personam jurisdiction if two
conditions are met. First, the defendant must have transacted busi-
ness in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from
that transaction of business.
Several courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted similar
"transacting business" tests in products liability cases to include out-
of-state acts that cause effects within the forum if the defendant
could foresee that his product would be marketed or used within the
forum.43 In such cases, the defendant usually meets the foreseeabil-
ity condition by placing his goods in a distribution chain or "stream
of commerce" that includes the forum state. This analysis closely
parallels the direct-effects test of the FSIA. First, the claim for relief
must arise from the defendant's contact with the jurisdiction, i e., the
marketing of his products within the forum. Second, this interpreta-
tion of "transaction of business" is wide enough to include a defend-
ant's out-of-state act that causes effects within the jurisdiction. The
defendant's act of placing his product in the stream of commerce
when he could have foreseen that it would be used or marketed
within the jurisdiction establishes the nexus between the out-of-state
act and its effect.44 Although such a case has not arisen in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, it is possible that the D.C. long-arm statute could
be similarly interpreted.
The "transaction of business" provision of the District of
Columbia statute, however, is either limited to cases where the
defendant's action allegedly takes place in the District of Colum-
41. The district court in Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), see note 40 supra, failed to recognize that the FSIA does not require
any contact in addition to the "direct effect" of the defendant's act; the D.C. statute does
require such additional contacts. The Harris court's mistaken reliance on the tortious
injury provision of the D.C. statute reflected its failure to recognize this fundamental
distinction.
42. D.C. CODE AN. § 13-423(a)(1) (1973), quotedat note 33 supra.
43. See, e.g., Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill.2d 393, 404-06 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1060 (1980); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., 71 Cal.2d 893,
458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). Exclusive reliance on the defendant's ability to
foresee that his product will be used or marketed in a forum is no longer sufficient for
personal jurisdiction under the due process clause. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). See generaly notes 66-93 infra and accompanying
text.
44. For a discussion of whether such a foreseeability test meets the constitutional
requirements of due process, see notes 65-94 infra and accompanying text.
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bia,45 or to products liabilities cases involving well-established
chains of distribution.46 While the foregoing analysis is one possible
approach to the direct-effects test, it is applicable only to the activi-
ties of foreign sovereigns involving the marketing of manufactured
products. The FSIA, however, is not principally designed to cover
such activity.47 Indeed, the direct-effects test encompasses all com-
mercial activities, not just those activities giving rise to products lia-
bility claims. The "transaction of business" clause of the District of
Columbia long-arm statute is thus of little use in the majority of
direct-effects cases.48
Since the "tortious injury" provision fails to emphasize the con-
nection between the lawsuit and the forum in establishing the "mini-
mum contacts" necessary for in personam jurisdiction,49 and since
courts usually apply the "transaction of business" provision to out-
of-state acts that are part of mass marketing chains, 50 Congress prob-
ably did not intend that the specfc provisions of section 13-423 be
incorporated into the FSIA.
In addition, it is not clear from the legislative history that Con-
gress intended to transfer wholesale the specific provisions of the
District of Columbia statute to the international arena. For exam-
ple, the House Report states that "[s]ection 1330(b) provides, in
effect, a Federal long-arm statute over foreign states. . . . It is pat-
terned after the long-arm statute Congress enacted for the District of
Columbia. . . . The requirements of minimum jurisdictional con-
tacts and adequate notice are embodied in the provision. '51 The
verb "patterned" coupled with the subsequent reference to "require-
45. See, e.g., Security Bank, N.A. v. Tauber, 347 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D.D.C. 1972);
Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808,
810 (U.S. App. D.C. 1976).
46. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
47. The House Report cited the following examples of the types of problems the
FSIA was enacted to cover
Instances of such contact occur when U.S. businessmen sell goods to a foreign
state trading company, and disputes may arise concerning the purchase price.
Another is when an American property owner agrees to sell land to a real estate
investor that turns out to be a foreign government entity and conditions in the
contract of sale may become a subject of contention. Still another example
occurs when a citizen crossing the street may be struck by an automobile owned
by a foreign embassy.
House REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws,
at 6605.
48. Even if the "transaction of business" clause of the D.C. statute applies to cases
arising under the FSIA, it still suffers from the same constitutional infirmities described
below in connection with § 18 of the Restatement. See notes 55-64 infra and accompany-
ing text.
49. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
51. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, at 6612 (emphasis added).
1981]
108 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:97
ments of minimum. . . contacts" indicates that Congress may have
intended the two statutes to be related only insofar as they both set
requirements of minimum contacts. The specific tests, however, are
not necessarily the same.52
At best, Congress's intent is unclear. Given the fundamental
difference in approach between the two statutes,53 and the ambigu-
ous language of the House Report, Congress probably did not intend
the specific provisions of the District of Columbia statute to be
applied to cases involving international long-arm jurisdiction.5 4
B. THE RESTATEMENT
The House Report asserts that the direct-effects test of section
1605(a)(2) is to be interpreted consistently with the principles set
forth in section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States.55 Section 18 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of jus-
52. This suggestion is confirmed later in the paragraph. "[E]ach of the immunity
provisions in the bill, sections 1605-1607, requires some connection between the lawsuit
and the United States." Id Thus, although the D.C. statute and the FSIA both set
requirements of minimum contacts, Congress may have intended that the particular con-
tacts required by the FSIA are to be determined by another source.
53. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
54. The entire problem of reconciling the D.C. statute and the FSIA is avoided, of
course, if the D.C. long-arm statute as a whole is read to merely prescribe the require-
ments of due process. In such a case, a court would ignore any statutory interpretation
and simply determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a particular defendant in
a particular case is constitutional. See Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood
Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810-11 (U.S. App. D.C. 1976), where the court
stated that the D.C. long-arm statute permits "the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution." This interpretation renders the specific provisions of the statute
itself superfluous. It is dubious whether Congress intended the FSIA to be so
unrestricted in its potential reach. Indeed, if Congress had intended the FSIA's personal
jurisdiction provisions to be as wide as the due process clause authorizes, there would
have been no need to refer to either the D.C. statute or the Restatement as guidelines.
55. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 6618. This much more concrete and specific legislative interpretation supports
the proposition advanced above that Congress did not intend the District of Columbia
long-arm statute to determine the sufficiency of the contacts necessary for personal juris-
diction under the FSIA. See note 25 supra.
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tice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.5
6
Section 18 specifies the circumstances under which the United
States may "prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory. '57 It is not a test for in per-
sonam jurisdiction. Section 18 defines a legislative rather than judi-
cial power.5 8
Section 18 distinguishes between generally recognized torts or
crimes and all other acts. If the conduct is a constituent element of a
generally recognized crime or tort, the state need only establish "that
the act outside the territory, and the effect within, [are also] constitu-
ent elements of such a crime or tort."' 59 On the other hand, if the
conduct is not a generally recognized crime or tort, the state must
show "more than a mere causal relationship: the effect within the
territory must be substantial and occur as a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory. '"60
In the context of actions other than "crimes or torts," section 18
principally addresses the issue of foreseeability. Thus, the Restate-
ment test requires a much closer nexus of foreseeability between the
conduct and its effect when the conduct is not a crime or tort. This
rule "will usually deal with conduct which was intended to produce
the effect within the territory in the sense that those responsible for
the conduct had reason to foresee that the effect within the territory
would result from the conduct outside. ",61
One reason for requiring a greater nexus of foreseeability for
conduct not generally recognized as criminal or tortious is that the
defendant's ability to foresee the effect of his criminal or tortious
activity in the forum state can be inferred from the nature of the
crime or tort itself.62 In such a case, the only issue is whether the
conduct and its effect are constituent elements of the crime or tort.63
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Id Comment e.
60. Id Comment f. It is relevant that many of the examples cited by the draftsmen
for acts that are not constituent elements of generally recognized crimes or torts are ones
that involve economic matters, such as actions in one country that lead to a decrease in
exports from another (no jurisdiction), or actions in one country that cause an effect in
another that violates the second country's antitrust laws (jurisdiction). See id, Com-
ments f-g, Illustrations 8-10.
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 18, Comment f (emphasis added).
62. Another equally important reason for not requiring as great a nexus between the
defendant's out-of-forum act and its effect in cases involving generally recognized crimes
or torts is the greater interest of the forum state in affording its residents adequate relief
in such cases.
63. But see Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (E.D.N.Y.
1979), where the court collapsed this distinction and applied the more restrictive foresee-
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The court will presume that the defendant intended the foreseeable
consequences of his tortious or criminal activity. 64
Section 18 of the Restatement provides a workable standard for
the direct-effects test. In many cases brought under the FSIA, how-
ever, application of section 18 will provide in personam jurisdiction
if the effect in the forum of the defendant's conduct outside the
forum is foreseeable. The next section explores the issue of whether
this foreseeability test meets the constitutional requirements of due
process.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
The due process clause of the 14th Amendment requires that the
defendant receive adequate notice of the suit against him 65 and be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.66 Originally, in per-
sonam jurisdiction depended upon a court's "de facto power over the
defendant's person," 67 which in turn depended upon his physical
presence in the jurisdiction. The physical-presence standard gave
way, however, as the Supreme Court "accepted and then abandoned
'consent,' 'doing business,' and 'presence'" as bases for jurisdic-
tion. 68 Finally, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 69 the Court
held that "due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment inpersonam,. . . he have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the . . . suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "70
ability test of§ 18(b) to the tort of negligence. It justified this interpretation solely on the
basis of Congress's use of the phrase "direct effects" in § 1605(a)(2). The court's analysis
is somewhat mystifying in light of § 18's unambiguous distinction between generally rec-
ognized torts or crimes and other acts. The Harris court begs the question when it states
that Congress's use of "direct" brings such cases within § 18(b) rather than § 18(a). The
principles of § 18 as a whole determine whether the greater or lesser restrictions shall
apply, not a tenuous interpretation of the word "direct."
64. Other sections of the Restatement similarly limit a government's power to pre-
scribe rules governing the out-of-state actions of non-residents. Section 30(2), for exam-
ple, provides that "[a] state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that
the conduct affects one of its nationals." RESTATFMENT, supra note 56, § 30(2). This
section precludes jurisdiction over aliens who injure nationals outside the territory
merely because the national returns and suffers tortious effects within the territory. This
requirement, like § 18, can be analyzed in terms of the reasonable foreseeability that the
effect of the defendant's out-of-state act will be felt in the forum state.
65. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950). This
requirement is satisfied by § 1608 of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976).
66. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
67. Id
68. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
69. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
70. Id at 316.
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The minimum contacts requirement has traditionally been seen
to serve two functions: "It protects the defendant against the bur-
dens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system. ' 71 While these two functions traditionally arise in
the context of limiting the jurisdiction of the state courts, they apply
equally to problems of international long-arm jurisdiction. Indeed,
the policy of protecting the defendant from the inconvenience of liti-
gating in a distant forum is more applicable in the international con-
text.
In determining the "fairness" or "reasonableness" of subjecting
a defendant to the jurisdiction of an inconvenient forum, the court
must balance several competing interests: first, the forum state's
interest in resolving the dispute;72 second, the plaintiff's interest in
choosing his own forum; 73 third, the court's interest in efficiently
resolving controversies; 74 and fourth, the state's interest in furthering
substantive social policies.75
These interests also apply to the question of international long-
arm jurisdiction. American citizens have increasingly greater con-
tacts with foreign sovereigns.76 Although the burdens involved in
litigating in a distant forum are greater in the international context,
courts must weigh such difficulties in light of the increased commer-
cial interaction between U.S. citizens and foreign sovereigns, as well
as the increased ease and convenience of long distance travel and
communication.77 An additional factor not present in the domestic
sphere is that in balancing the foreign sovereign's inconvenience
against the fairness to U.S. citizens in providing a forum for their
grievances, the courts should consider that immunity pleas of the
U.S. government are routinely ignored in foreign jurisdictions.78
Although the difficulties of working with and understanding a some-
times unfamiliar legal system compound the defendant's problem of
litigating in a foreign jurisdiction, the sovereign immunity practice
of other nations is an important factor in resolving the issue of fair-
71. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
72. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
73. See Kulko v. Superior Ct. of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
74. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
75. Kulko v. Superior Ct. of California, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 (1978).
76. See HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 6605.
77. See note 80 infra and accompanying text.
78. HousE REPORT, smupra note 10, at 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, at 6607.
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ness to the parties. 79
The second function traditionally served by the "minimum con-
tacts" requirement is to insure that the states do not reach beyond
their powers as coequal sovereigns in the federal system. This func-
tion also applies in the international sphere. The concept of "sover-
eignty" suggests that foreign nations shall not be subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. U.S. courts are therefore con-
strained to treat foreign nations with the same (or greater) degree of
deference as are the fifty states with respect to each other.
Courts have substantially relaxed the test for in personam juris-
diction since International Shoe. This trend reflects the increasingly
interstate character of business transactions coupled with the greater
ease of transportation and communication across state lines.8 0 Nev-
ertheless, as the Supreme Court stated in Hanson v. Dencla,8 1
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respec-
tive States.
82
Such considerations of territorial limitations apply with even greater
force in the international arena.
In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,83 the Court reit-
erated that the "minimum contacts" requirement cannot be eroded
simply because of the increased ease with which a defendant can
defend himself in any forum. In that case, the plaintiff sought juris-
diction in Oklahoma over both the New York dealer and New York
distributor of an automobile involved in an Oklahoma accident.
The plaintiff argued that since the dealer and his distributor were
79. Other jurisdictions are enacting their own foreign sovereign immunities acts. For
example, the United Kingdom enacted such a statute in 1978. See State Immunity Act
1978, ch. 33, reprinted in 17 INV'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1123 (1978). Canada is also consid-
ering the enactment of sovereign immunity legislation. See Brower, Bistline & Loomis,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 210
n.66 (1979).
80. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court stated:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of. . . jurisdiction over. . . nonresi-
dents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch
two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With
this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the
amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time mod-
em transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 222-23.
81. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
82. Id at 251 (citations omitted).
83. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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members of a nationwide chain of distribution, and since
automobiles are necessarily mobile, the defendants could foresee
that the car would be used in Oklahoma. The plaintiff, citing Han-
son v. Denckla, 84 argued that when a defendant-seller can foresee
that his product will be used in another forum, and the product is
capable of causing injury in that forum, he has "purposefully
avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within
[that] forum State,"'85 and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of its
courts.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the defendants' ability to
foresee that the car would be used in Oklahoma was insufficient to
subject them to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court."8 6 Before
jurisdiction will lie, the Court required that the defendants have rea-
son to foresee that they would be liable to suit in that state.87
ITihe foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. . . . The
Due Process Clause . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system
that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit.
88
The Court reasoned that if the plaintiff's argument prevailed,
then a defendant's amenability to personal jurisdiction would travel
wherever it was foreseeable that his product could be used. 9 Thus,
the unilateral activity of a plaintiff would determine where the
defendant could be sued. The Court rejected this conclusion in Han-
son v. Denckla, 90 stating that the mere "unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."91
84. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
85. Id at 253.
86. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
"'[Foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdic-
tion." Id.
87. Id at 297.
88. Id (emphasis added).
89. The Court noted that if the plaintiffs foreseeability argument was the criterion,
[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service
of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel. We recently
abandoned the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), that the
interest of a creditor in a debt could be extinguished or otherwise affected by any
State having transitory jurisdiction over the debtor. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977). Having interred the mechanical rule that a creditor's amenability to
a quasi in rem action travels with his debtor, we are unwilling to endorse an
analogous principle in the present case.
Id at 296.
90. 357 U.S. 235 (1953).
91. Id at 253.
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The Court's analysis of the element of foreseeability is relevant
to the direct-effects clause of the FSIA. World- Wide Volkswagen
suggests that the direct-effects test, as construed by section 18 of the
Restatement, may result in constitutionally insufficient contacts
between a foreign sovereign and the United States.
Section 18(a) permits jurisdiction over a defendant who causes
an effect in the jurisdiction if both the act outside the jurisdiction as
well as the effect within are elements of a generally recognized crime
or tort. As previously discussed, at least one rationale for permitting
jurisdiction under such circumstances is that a court will infer that a
defendant who commits a generally recognized crime or tort has rea-
son to foresee the natural consequences of his activity. The holding
in World- Wide Volkswagen, however, prevents a court from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over a defendant merely because his out-of-state act
causes tortious injury within the jurisdiction. Due Process now
requires that a court look beyond the mere foreseeability of the
defendant causing tortious injury and examine, in addition, the fore-
seeability of the defendant being haled into court. Although the
defendants in World- Wide Volkswagen allegedly caused tortious
injury in Oklahoma, and although the court inferred that by the
nature of their business they could have foreseen causing such
injury, the court would not infer that the defendants could anticipate
being haled into court in that state. Although the commission of a
tort is one factor that a court might consider in determining whether
a defendant could foresee being subject to a forum's jurisdiction, it is
not dispositive.
Section 18(b) of the Restatement is similarly deficient. The test
set forth in that section permits jurisdiction if the defendant's out-of-
state act causes a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect in the
forum jurisdiction.92 World- Wide Wolkswagen applies even more
forcefully here. Section 18(b) is concerned solely with whether the
defendant can foresee his causing a direct and substantial effect in
the forum jurisdiction. Unlike the Due Process requirement enunci-
ated in World- Wide Volkswagen, it does not require that the defend-
ant be able to reasonably foresee being haled into court in that
forum. While a court would no doubt consider the foreseeability of
the nexus between the defendant's act and its accompanying effect in
determining whether the defendant could anticipate being subject to
its jurisdiction, such an examination alone is far from dispositive.93
92. See notes 54-63 supra and accompanying text.
93. Cf. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 592
F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979):
Even if, as plaintiffs allege, the Libyan government was aware that the Bahamian
subsidiaries were being used merely as conduits to supply Nepco and its custom-
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It is, of course, possible for a defendant to meet the tests set
forth in section 18 and be constitutionally amenable to jurisdiction.
If, for example, the defendant committed an egregious crime that
caused an immediate and direct effect in the jurisdiction,94 the court
could infer the defendant's ability to foresee his being haled into
court. Where courts are unwilling to make that inference, however,
the direct-effects clause of the FSIA, as interpreted by section 18 of
the Restatement, will authorize personal jurisdiction in contraven-
tion of the Due Process mandate of World- Wide Volkswagen.
CONCLUSION
Congress left the task of interpreting the direct-effects test to the
courts. This Note reveals the substantial difficulties involved in
developing a workable direct-effects test. Although Congress sug-
gested that this test was to be "patterned" after the District of
Columbia long-arm statute, no specific provision of that statute fits
the direct-effects test. Additionally, although section 18 of the
Restatement is a plausible test, it fails to meet due process require-
ments in its full range of application. Because the Restatement does
not directly address the question of whether a defendant could antic-
ipate being subject to the jurisdiction of a distant forum, it is consti-
tutionally deficient as a test for in personam jurisdiction.
Terence . Pell
ers, and even if-as seems likely--the 1974 embargo was designed to have a
direct effect of a sort on the United States, the effect in question (deprivation of
oil to Bahamian corporations) is not one that creates the requisite minimum con-
tacts. There has been absoluteiy no attempt by Libya or NOC to avail itself of any
of the protections or privileges afforded by the United States-rather, in fact, the
reverse.
Id at 1101 (emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT supra note 55, § 18, Comment c, illustration 2 (a non-
resident commits homicide by shooting across the border). Of course, a foreign sovereign
engaged in commercial activity is unlikely to commit such a clear-cut and egregious
crime.
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